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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimina-
tion based on an individual’s sex, race, color, national origin, and/or religion.1
The statute permits plaintiffs to bring discrimination cases under two different
theories: disparate treatment, which requires a showing of the employer’s dis-
criminatory intent, and disparate impact, which holds the employer liable
absent intent to discriminate if it uses neutral employment policies or practices
that have a disparate impact on a protected group. Ricci v. DeStefano signifi-
cantly affects the interpretation of both of these theories of discrimination.2
The case arose out of written and oral examinations that the City of New
Haven gave in 2003 to its firefighters who applied for promotions to lieutenant
and captain positions.3 Despite the City’s hiring of an independent consultant,
I/O Solutions (IOS), to create a fair, job related evaluative instrument, the
results of the exam were disconcerting.4 In a City where more than one third of
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1 It states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
2 See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case & the
Triumph of White Privilege, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161 (2011); Cheryl I. Harris &
Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness,
58 UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010); Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against
the “Built-in Headwinds” of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (2011); Rich-
ard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010).
3 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009); Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d
142, 145 (D. Conn. 2006).
4 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665.
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the population is black and more than one fourth is Hispanic,5 no blacks and
only two Hispanics would be eligible for promotions. The rest of the promo-
tions would go to white firefighters.6 This result obtained even though twenty-
seven blacks and twenty-three Hispanics took the promotional exams.
City leaders, especially the Corporation Counsel, Thomas Ude, worried
that the test had an illegal disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics.7 Because
of a history of discrimination and lawsuits by minority firefighters,8 the City’s
concern was justifiable. Like other fire departments across the country, white
men—predominately Irish, Italian, and German—had historically dominated
the New Haven Fire Department.9 Generation upon generation of male
firefighters had handed the jobs down to family members who were almost
invariably of the same ethnic heritage.10 This structure led to extreme racial
underrepresentation in the fire department. For example, in 1973, firefighters
were less than four percent black, and none was Hispanic, even though minori-
ties represented approximately thirty percent of the City’s population.11 While
prospects for men of color have improved significantly as a result of a number
of lawsuits filed against the New Haven Fire Department, there is still signifi-
cant underrepresentation of blacks at the higher ranks and of Hispanics in
firefighter and upper level positions. Today, while thirty-seven percent of the
City’s population is black, approximately thirty percent of the firefighters,
twenty-two percent of the lieutenants, and four percent of the captains are
black.12 Twenty-six percent of the New Haven population is Hispanic; thirteen
percent of firefighters, fourteen percent of lieutenants, and sixteen percent of
captains are Hispanic.13
By city charter, the Civil Service Board (CSB) was responsible to certify
the exam results. After the results of the 2003 exam became public, the CSB
5 ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), available
at http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_
08_1YR_DP5&prodType=table.
6 Seventy-seven candidates took the lieutenant’s exam: 43 whites, 19 blacks, and 15 Hispan-
ics. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 145. Thirty-four passed: 25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics.
Id. Forty-one applicants took the captain’s exam: 25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Id.
Twenty-two passed the exam: 16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Id. But passing the test
was not enough. Id. Because the City hired from a list which used a “rule of three” (meaning
that the City would consider the top three candidates for each position) only those at the top
of the list were eligible for promotion. Id. For the lieutenant’s position, 10 were eligible for
promotion to fill 8 positions: all were white. Id. For the captain’s position, 9 were eligible
for promotion to fill 7 spots: 7 whites and 2 Hispanics. Id. In total, no blacks and 2 Hispanics
were eligible out of the 27 blacks and 23 Hispanics who took the test. Id.
7 Id.
8 See Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 581, 591 (2010).
9 For a discussion of this history, see id. at 588–95.
10 Id. at 589.
11 Nicole Allan & Emily Bazelon, The Ladder - Entry 4: Is There a Better Way to Decide
Who Gets Promoted?, SLATE, June 25, 2009, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_polit-
ics/jurisprudence/features/2009/the_ladder/part_4_is_there_a_better_way_to_decide_who_
gets_promoted.single.htmlhttp://www.slate.com/id/2221250/entry2221298/.
12 See Chart provided by Victor Bolden (Dec. 9, 2009) (on file with the Nevada Law
Journal).
13 Id.
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held five hearings,14 heard testimony from various sources, and ultimately
voted not to certify the results.15 This vote rankled many of the white members
of the fire department who believed the CSB’s vote deprived them of an oppor-
tunity for promotions they had earned by doing well on the exam. These pro-
motions come up rarely, and it could be years before they would have another
opportunity.
Backed by the firefighters’ union, seventeen white firefighters and one
Hispanic firefighter who sat for the promotional exams sued, alleging that the
City violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution when it threw
out the exam results. The plaintiffs alleged that because the City’s decision to
throw out the test results was based on the race of the successful test takers,16
the City had acted improperly. It did not matter, according to the plaintiffs, that
the City may have acted in good faith to avoid an illegal disparate impact on
protected minorities.17 The mere consideration of race when the City refused to
certify the test was sufficient evidence of disparate treatment under Title VII.
The federal district court disagreed with the plaintiff’s theory; it granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment,18 and the Second Circuit panel
affirmed summarily.19
Eventually, the case made its way to the United States Supreme Court.20
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a good faith belief
that the testing created an illegal disparate impact on racial minorities is insuffi-
cient as a defense to a disparate treatment claim that arose as a result of the
City’s overt use of race to throw out the results.21 Instead, over a strong dissent,
the Court concluded that the City must have “a strong basis in evidence that,
14 Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145–50 (D. Conn. 2006).
15 Id. at 150.
16 Id. at 144.
17 The plaintiffs also argued a more nefarious motive on the City’s part. They argued that
the City was pressured by a black minister who used significant political power to influence
the City to throw out the results. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683–89 (2009)
(Alito, J., concurring). While this second version of the events leading to the rejection of the
results is not credited by the majority opinion, Justice Alito’s concurrence appears to take it
as fact. Id.
18 Ricci, 554 F. Supp.2d. at 145.
19 Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev’d 129 S. Ct. 2658
(2009). In a per curiam opinion, the Second Circuit panel stated in part:
In this case, the Civil Service Board found itself in the unfortunate position of having no good
alternatives. We are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs’ expression of frustration. Mr. Ricci, for
example, who is dyslexic, made intensive efforts that appear to have resulted in his scoring
highly on one of the exams, only to have it invalidated. But it simply does not follow that he has
a viable Title VII claim. To the contrary, because the Board, in refusing to validate the exams,
was simply trying to fulfill its obligations under Title VII when confronted with test results that
had a disproportionate racial impact, its actions were protected.
Id. Later, the Second Circuit voted not to hear the case en banc. Id. at 88.
20 It also figured prominently in the Senate confirmation hearings for then Judge Sonia
Sotomayor’s nomination to the United States Supreme Court because Judge Sotomayor had
sat on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel that decided the case against the plaintiffs.
For a discussion of the impact of the case on the hearings, see McGinley, supra note 8, at
613–18.
21 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2663–64.
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had it” certified the results, “it would have been liable under [Title VII] dispa-
rate-impact” theory; the Court concluded as a matter of law that the defendants
did not meet the necessary threshold standard.22 Because it decided the case
under Title VII, the Court did not reach the question of whether the City’s
behavior was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.23
Ricci is important because it redefines discrimination. It adopts a restric-
tive interpretation of the disparate impact theory that is inconsistent with Con-
gressional intent and purpose, and signals that intentional discrimination is
more important than disparate impact. Simultaneously, it appears to broaden
the disparate treatment theory, but this new interpretation of disparate treatment
is selective: it expands the definition of discriminatory intent to include any
overt consideration of a protected characteristic. By its literal interpretation of
intent—intent means any conscious, explicit consideration of race in making
employment decisions—it appears to disregard unconscious discrimination or
implicit bias as supporting a possible cause of action under disparate treatment
law.24
These changes in both disparate impact and disparate treatment, which
ignore history and the changing nature of discrimination, make Ricci one of the
worst recent cases decided by the Supreme Court. Ricci endorses finding dis-
crimination against white men who have been privileged by history and the
structure of the fire department while simultaneously ignoring the history and
practices that led to the low numbers of minority men in supervisory positions
in the fire department. It also appears to credit obvious and explicit discrimina-
tion over the less obvious but implicit biases caused by structures and attitudes
that hinder the progress of women and minority men in the workplace.
II. RICCI’S HARMS
A. Upsetting the Balance between Treatment and Impact
One of the unfortunate aspects of Ricci is the Court’s treatment of dispa-
rate impact as the illegitimate stepsister of the disparate treatment cause of
action. The Court held that even if the City had discarded the test results in
good faith to avoid liability under the disparate impact clause of Title VII, it
would still face liability because it considered the race of the individuals who
would have been eligible for promotion based on the test. The only escape from
liability for disparate treatment against the plaintiffs would be proof of a
“strong basis in evidence” that the City would be liable under disparate impact
22 Id. at 2664–65. The Court did not reach the question of whether the disparate impact
provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For an inter-
esting discussion of this issue, see Primus, supra note 2.
23 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia argued in his concurrence that the disparate impact provision
of Title VII violates the Equal Protection Clause. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681–83 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
24 This conclusion is supported by the decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541, 2552 (2011). For a discussion of the science of implicit bias, see Ann C. McGinley,
Discrimination Redefined, 75 MO. L. REV. 443, 445–49 (2010); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La
Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
415 (2000); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005).
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theory if it chose to award promotions based on the test results. The Court held
further that, as a matter of law, there was no strong basis in evidence supporting
the City’s refusal to certify the test results. This treatment of the relative impor-
tance of disparate treatment and disparate impact is particularly problematic
because of the history of Title VII.
1. History of Disparate Impact Provisions
The original language of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act mentioned
neither intent nor impact. Rather, it stated that it is illegal to discriminate
“because of” a person’s race or other protected characteristics. Early on, courts
interpreted this language to require a showing of an intent to discriminate
because of an individual’s membership in a protect class. Soon after Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act, however, activists and key personnel at all levels
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recognized that a
focus on intentional discrimination under Title VII would limit the statute’s
usefulness in combating racial inequalities in the workplace.25 They began to
bring cases in the lower courts to clarify that disparate impact was a legitimate
theory under Title VII. One of these cases, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,26
reached the Supreme Court by 1971.
Plaintiff Griggs challenged the defendant’s use of intelligence tests and
diploma requirements for particular positions within the power company. The
lower court dismissed the case, holding that there was no evidence of inten-
tional discrimination and therefore a cause of action under Title VII did not
exist.27 The Supreme Court reversed and held that an employer who, absent an
intent to discriminate, used a neutral policy that created a disparate impact on
members of a protected class would be liable under Title VII unless it could
prove that its policy had a “demonstrable relationship to successful perform-
ance of the jobs for which [they were] used.”28 The Court declared that the
“touchstone is business necessity,” and assigned the employer with the burden
of proving “that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.”29 This interpretation was the law of the land until
1989.
In 1989, eighteen years after Griggs, the Supreme Court decided Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, a case that made it much more difficult to prove a
disparate impact cause of action and that held that the burden of proof never
shifted to the employer to prove business necessity.30 Instead, the plaintiff had
to prove the absence of a business justification. In large part because of sub-
stantial opposition to Wards Cove, Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights
Act,31 which restored the disparate impact cause of action. The amended Act
included a disparate impact provision in the statute for the first time. It stated:
25 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 24, 73, 78 (1994).
26 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
27 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
28 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
29 Id. at 431–32.
30 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652–58 (1989).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006).
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(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this subchapter only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in paragraph (C) with
respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt
such alternative employment practice.32
For our purposes, the most important lessons we should learn from this
history are: first, Congress considered the disparate impact cause of action so
important that it chose to amend the statute to overrule the Supreme Court’s
narrow interpretation of the disparate impact cause of action; second, when
Congress amended the statute, it broadened significantly the interpretation of
the disparate impact provision and restored the job relatedness and business
necessity as affirmative defenses to be proved by the defendant; third, Congress
codified case law before Wards Cove that permitted the plaintiffs to win even if
the employer proved job relatedness and business necessity of the practice in
question if the plaintiff could prove that an alternative policy was available to
the employer that would have a less discriminatory effect.
To what extent is Ricci untrue to this Congressional intent and purpose in
passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991? As noted above, Ricci appears to see
disparate impact as a less important form of discrimination, one that should
yield to disparate treatment. This conclusion quietly contradicts the Congres-
sional purpose in amending the Act to assure the important place of disparate
impact in the statutory scheme. Second, the Court concludes as a matter of law
that there is no strong basis in evidence that the test the firefighters took in
Ricci was not business related or consistent with business necessity or that
there were any viable alternatives.
But, the Court’s conclusions occur in an unusual procedural setting that
deprived the City an opportunity to take discovery and present a full defense.
The Court, in essence, overstepped the bounds of its power by granting judg-
ment to the plaintiffs without remanding to permit the defendant to prove its
case or for a jury to hear the case.
2. The Procedural Posture in Ricci
To understand the harm in Ricci, we must consider the procedural posture
of the case. It is particularly complicated and few have paid close attention
notwithstanding the high profile of the case in general. First, the case was
decided below on motions for summary judgment. The federal district court
granted summary judgment to the defendant City in response to the parties’
cross motions for summary judgment. It concluded that throwing out a test
based on its disparate impact on minority firefighters did not prove animus or
intent to discriminate. On appeal, the Second Circuit panel affirmed. The Sec-
ond Circuit then refused to hear the case en banc.
32 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). Paragraph (C) states: “The demonstration referred to by subpara-
graph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect
to the concept of ‘alternative employment practice.’” Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C).
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On review, the United States Supreme Court not only established a new
test but also granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Ordinarily, when the
Supreme Court announces a new evidentiary standard, it remands the case to
the lower court to consider the evidence. It would have been appropriate in this
case to permit the parties to develop the evidence through discovery because
the Court had announced a new applicable standard. Instead, the Supreme
Court moved forward even though there was no trial below and no fact finding
by the lower court that the Supreme Court could rely upon. The Supreme Court
then placed the defendant City in the position of proving that it met a standard
for which it had never had the opportunity to develop the evidence or to prove
that it met the standard in the lower court below. Further, the Court in essence
required the City to make out the case of its own culpability—the case that
potential minority plaintiffs would have made in a hypothetical disparate
impact suit against the City if it had used the test results.
Let’s clarify this point. Under the 1991 Act, the plaintiffs must prove that
the defendant’s neutral employment policy created a disparate impact on a pro-
tected group. Once that burden is met, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
defendant to prove its affirmative defense that the policy—here, the test—was
job-related and consistent with business necessity by a preponderance of the
evidence.33 Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts again to
the plaintiffs to prove that alternative less discriminatory selection criteria exist
that the defendant refused to adopt.34 If the defendant does not meet its burden
of proof on its affirmative defense, or if the plaintiff can prove less discrimina-
tory alternatives exist, the plaintiffs—members of the protected class who bring
the suit alleging disparate impact—will prevail.
In this case, the Court tossed these ordinary procedural rules upside down.
There was no dispute that the test created a disparate impact on blacks and
Hispanics, but that was not sufficient for the Court. In an ordinary case, where
the plaintiffs are those suffering from the disparate impact, at this point, the
burden of proof would shift to the defendant to prove job relatedness and busi-
ness necessity. Here, however, the Court placed the defendants in the position
of proving the existence of strong evidence that the test was not job related and
not consistent with business necessity. Because the City was, in essence, stand-
ing in for the minority test takers, the Court also required it to prove that there
was strong evidence that an equally valid alternative existed that the City had
not adopted. Remember that in this case there had never been a trial so the
evidence had not been developed before it reached the Supreme Court. Based
on the evidence in the record, the Supreme Court granted judgment to the plain-
tiffs. This ruling, then, determines that as a matter of law there was insufficient
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have concluded that: 1)
there was strong evidence that the test was not job related and consistent with
business necessity; and 2) there was strong evidence that alternative less dis-
criminatory testing mechanisms existed.
33 Id. § 2000e(m); Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
34 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
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3. Disputing the Evidence on Job Relatedness and Business Necessity
Remember that the evidence considered here was testimony before the
Civil Service Board, offered by the defendant to prove its good faith and lack
of discriminatory animus when it threw out the test. It had not been prepared to
respond to the Court’s newly adopted standard. Nonetheless, there was signifi-
cant evidence that the test was not job related or consistent with business neces-
sity. Although some white firefighters, including Frank Ricci, testified that the
test was fair and job related, other firefighters testified that some of the ques-
tions tested for knowledge that was not relevant to firefighting in New
Haven.35 A number of firefighters complained about several questions that
were obviously taken from exams for other cities whose practices differed from
those in New Haven.36 This failure was exacerbated by IOS’s use, at the City’s
suggestion, of reviewers before administering the test who were not from New
Haven and who were not familiar with New Haven Fire Department prac-
tices.37 There was also testimony that the materials were available more readily
and earlier to the white firefighters because of their extensive connections to
family and friends.38
The CSB also heard from the representative from IOS, who explained the
care the company took to assure a fair test, and from Christopher Hornick, a
testing consultant, who criticized the test.39 Hornick expressed surprise at the
disparity in the scores between the whites and the minority candidates and
stated that the statistical disparity might have resulted from the collective bar-
gaining agreement’s 60/40 percent weighting of written and oral examina-
tions.40 He also posited that the differential may have resulted from the City’s
failure to review the test for relevancy before it was administered and that
“there [were] more appropriate ways to assess [a person’s] ability to serve as a
captain or lieutenant.”41 Another witness, “Vincent Lewis, a fire program spe-
cialist from the Department of Homeland Security,” testified that he believed
the candidates should know the materials and that “the questions were
relevant.”42
Moreover, evidence suggested that it was not the test alone that created the
problematic results. Because of an old provision in a collective bargaining
agreement (negotiated between the City and the predominately white union),
the City had required IOS to create a written test that would count for 60 per-
cent and an oral exam that would count for 40 percent of the total. IOS never
considered altering this ratio, even though a representative of the black
firefighters’ professional association testified that there was something wrong
with the test, and advised the CSB to look at nearby Bridgeport, Connecticut’s
35 Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d per curiam 530 F.3d
87 (2d. Cir. 200), rev’d 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 147.
38 Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2693 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
39 Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 147–49.
40 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2668.
41 Id. at 2670 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 Id. at 2669 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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criteria for promotions.43 Evidence suggested that Bridgeport, a neighboring
community, had achieved diversity throughout its ranks by weighing the oral
portions of the promotional exams more heavily.
Testimony also suggested that the City’s required treatment of the results
might be partially at fault for the results. The City Charter’s “Rule of Three”
required that for each open position, the City consider the top three candidates.
That meant only the top ten candidates for the lieutenant’s position would be
considered for eight open jobs; only the top nine candidates for the captain’s
position would be considered for seven openings in the captain’s jobs. Thus,
even though a number of black and Hispanic firefighters passed the tests, they
would not receive consideration for the open positions because their test scores
did not rank them among the very top. Some jurisdictions use “banding” rather
than hiring from a list in which scores within a range are considered equal for
purposes of consideration. This practice may have permitted the consideration
of some of the black or Hispanic firefighters who passed the test. Janet Helms,
an expert in how race and culture influence test performance, testified that,
regardless of the type of written test administered, members of under-
represented groups will fare worse than whites.44
4. Considering Less Discriminatory Alternatives
Even assuming the test was job related and consistent with business neces-
sity as a matter of law, much of the testimony in the subsection above would
also be relevant to the proof of less discriminatory alternatives. The evidence
suggested, for example, that differential weighting of the oral and written tests
might have a less discriminatory effect. Use of “banding” rather than a list with
a “rule of three” would also be a valid less discriminatory alternative. Finally,
there was testimony that, rather than pen and paper tests, other departments
used “assessment centers” to assess command presence, and that use of these
centers eliminated the disparate results sometimes obtained from written exams
while simultaneously assessing more accurately how the firefighter would per-
form in the actual job itself.
5. Ricci: What Result Should Have Obtained?
Certainly, especially given that the Supreme Court had established a new
standard and there had never been a trial, this evidence should have been suffi-
cient for a remand with an opportunity for adequate discovery on the issues in
question. This evidence, presented by the defendant, appears to create at least
genuine issues of material fact on the question of whether a strong basis in
evidence exists as to whether the test was job related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity and whether a less discriminatory alternative existed.
The Supreme Court’s conclusion that as a matter of law the defendant’s
proof was insufficient appears to create a very high standard for determining
whether an employer can defend its decision to throw out the results of a pro-
motional test. This opinion will therefore create incentives for employers to use
tests that have disparate results because of the difficulty of defending a decision
43 Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
44 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2669.
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not to use the test. While it may also create an interest in employers to get it
right before administering the testing mechanisms, it appears to raise the bar for
plaintiffs in future disparate impact cases, and may therefore discourage
employers from attempting to assure that its testing mechanisms do not have a
disparate impact on minorities. It will likely be much more difficult for minor-
ity plaintiffs to prove disparate impact cases in the future. Thus, Ricci tips the
balance toward white, non-minority plaintiffs who have not suffered from
structural discrimination, a type of discrimination that is better remedied by
disparate impact than disparate treatment claims.45
Ricci thus qualifies easily for a list of “worst” Supreme Court decisions.
But nonetheless, a more generous reading of the Supreme Court’s decision, one
that rehabilitates it to a degree, may be in order.
B. Saved by the Second Circuit? Interpreting Ricci for Reasonable Results
in a Disparate Impact Case
In U.S. v. Brennan,46 the Second Circuit interpreted “strong basis in evi-
dence” to include evidence of: 1) a prima facie case of disparate impact or a
strong basis in evidence of a disparate impact; and 2) a strong basis in evidence
either that the employment test was neither job related nor business necessity or
that there was an equally valid, less discriminatory alternative that the employer
refused to adopt.47 A strong basis in evidence, according to the Second Circuit,
requires more than speculation or a few strands of evidence but less than a
preponderance of evidence required for liability.48 It is an objective test that is
measured at the time the public entity made its race- or gender-conscious deci-
sion.49 The court stated:
We think Ricci suggests that a strong basis in evidence is a balanced standard that
falls somewhere in the middle between these upper and lower extremes. In borrowing
the strong-basis-in-evidence standard from a line of Equal Protection cases, the Ricci
Court stated that those cases ‘recognized the tension between eliminating segregation
and discrimination on the one hand and doing away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race on the other.’ Balancing those two goals requires ‘evi-
dentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action is warranted . . . .’50
The Second Circuit continues to explain that a strong basis in the evidence
is not the same standard as used to assess a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause. Title VII, the court notes, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, “has
repeatedly been construed so as not to undermine employers’ ability to under-
take ‘voluntary compliance,’ which is ‘the preferred means of achieving objec-
tives of Title VII.’”51 Thus, according to Brennan, in Title VII cases the
defendant need not prove its own violation in order to prevail.
The Second Circuit also interpreted another requirement imposed by
Ricci: that the employer prove that race conscious action is necessary to avoid
45 See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 2, at 83–85.
46 United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2011).
47 Id. at 109.
48 Id. at 109–10.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 112–13 (citation omitted).
51 Id. at 113.
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liability.52 According to the Second Circuit, this proof is also established by
demonstrating a strong basis in the evidence that race conscious action was
necessary to avoid litigation and the employer’s exposure to liability. In sum,
the employer’s good faith belief is not sufficient proof in order for the defen-
dant to avoid liability, and the employer needs to prove objectively that its race
conscious action was justified in order to defeat a “reverse-discrimination”
claim. Nonetheless, the employer need not prove an actual violation of Title
VII in order to show a strong basis in the evidence that it was necessary to use
the race conscious remedy.53
The Second Circuit’s interpretation should help guide employers who
attempt to protect themselves from both disparate treatment and disparate
impact litigation. It creates a balance between the requirements of disparate
treatment and disparate impact, a balance that employers should consider in
determining whether to discard results of promotional tests or other sorting
mechanisms in the workplace. Of course, the Court in Ricci seemed to say that
the timing matters. Employers who are at the front end of the process—who are
creating promotional tests, for example—still seem to be permitted to consider
race or gender in creating the tests.54 But an unfortunate employer who is faced
with disparate results of a promotional test need not despair. Ricci and Bren-
nan, when considered together, should encourage the employer who is in this
position to collect evidence carefully before making a decision to throw out the
test results. If the employer can find significant evidence to support the position
that the test is not job related and consistent with business necessity or that
there are good alternatives to the test given, that employer may still disregard
the test results. It is far safer, however, for the employer to anticipate the poten-
tial problems before administering the test and not to announce or administer
the test if there may be problems with it.
52 Id. at 114.
53 Id.
54 Reva Siegel, for example, argues that Justice Kennedy, the fifth vote for the majority and
the author of the opinion, joined the majority not out of allegiance to a colorblind approach
but because of a more moderate fear of public balkanization that would result from uphold-
ing the lower courts’ orders. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization:
An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1332–48
(2011). This argument makes sense, in light of decisions by other moderates on the Court
with reference to the cases decided under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, Justices Pow-
ell’s, O’Connor’s, and Kennedy’s jurisprudential leanings may be explained more accurately
by considering the antibalkanization principle. For Title VII interpretation, to the extent
antibalkanization is the underlying theory of the moderate justices in a case like Ricci, we
can attribute Ricci’s focus on the stage in the proceedings—throwing out the test after the
results are in—as key to its decision. The opinion has strong language focusing on the
expectations of the firefighters who studied hard for and passed the test. Thus, at least the
moderate wing of the Supreme Court—i.e., Justice Kennedy—might not concern himself
with a race conscious approach to creating the tests in advance in order to avoid a disparate
impact that harms black and Hispanic firefighters. Until a fifth conservative justice is
appointed to the Supreme Court, then, lower courts should seriously consider the position of
the moderate justices and should be careful in asserting the colorblind approach.
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C. Disparate Treatment—Does it Benefit from Ricci?
In Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case
of Unintended Consequences?, Michael Zimmer acknowledges damage done to
disparate impact theory but sees a potential silver lining in easing of Title VII
requirements to prove disparate treatment.55 He explains that before Ricci mere
consideration of a person’s race or gender was insufficient to constitute race or
sex discrimination. The employer must have a purpose to discriminate because
of an individual’s membership in the protected class. Now, Zimmer argues,
consideration alone of the individual’s race or membership in a protected group
is sufficient to trigger liability under the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination.
While I acknowledge that Zimmer might be right, I am skeptical that
lower courts will read Ricci as permitting a lesser showing in intentional dis-
crimination cases, especially those cases brought by women and minorities.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Court’s most recent employment discrimi-
nation case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,56 in which the five member major-
ity expressed skepticism at the importance and use of “social frameworks
theory” which explains why supervisors’ subjective decision making can be
infused with bias.57
Although the issue before the Court in Dukes was the propriety of a class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) where the plaintiffs
had demanded backpay, the majority in Dukes reached out to question the
underlying theory of discrimination that Wal-Mart was responsible for the dis-
criminatory results of subjective decision making of its supervisors when pro-
moting in-store managers or giving pay raises. In Dukes the differential
between men and women was substantial: women constituted 70 percent of the
hourly jobs but only 33 percent of management and women were paid less than
men in every region; the salary gaps between men and women widened over
time even when they were performing the same job.58 While the more liberal
justices suggested during oral argument that this difference may be sufficient to
hold an employer liable for discriminatory intent, the justices in the majority
found this evidence unconvincing.59 Instead, the majority opinion clung to the
importance of the retailer’s formal written policy against sex discrimination.
Without an overall policy of discrimination or significant evidence of common
treatment, the Court refused to allow the plaintiffs to develop their case.
Both Ricci and Dukes thus advocate an approach that heightens the impor-
tance of formal policies and direct evidence of explicit conscious discrimina-
tion. I am more concerned about the viability after Ricci and Dukes of implicit
bias as constituting intentional discrimination in a systemic disparate treatment
case or its use in a disparate impact case where the neutral practice is subjective
decision making. The failure to recognize implicit bias and unconscious dis-
55 Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A
Case of Unintended Consequences?, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1307 (2010).
56 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011).
57 Id. at 2553–55.
58 Id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59 Transcript of Oral Argument. at 6–7, 10–13, 29–31, 36, 40, 42, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277).
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crimination in a world where the face of discrimination is changing is trouble-
some, and it, too, makes it more difficult for those originally intended as the
beneficiaries of Title VII. Because of a fear of litigation and liability and soci-
ety’s aversion to racism and to a lesser extent, sexism, there is less overt evi-
dence of discrimination against women and persons of color. But, the statistics
and anecdotal evidence in Dukes make clear that everything is not alright. We
have not overcome racial or sex discrimination in employment.
III. CONCLUSION
In concluding that the defendants violated the statute’s ban on disparate
treatment, Ricci emphasizes an ahistorical view of discrimination. It views the
only wrong as the defendants’ overt and conscious use of race to overturn the
test results. It ignores, however, the defendants’ reason for doing so and the
history of racial discrimination in the country that has led to practices and
structures causing a disparate impact on persons of color. At the same time, the
Court narrowed the definition of disparate impact. It concluded that as a matter
of law the defendant did not have a strong basis in evidence to support its
failure to use the concededly disparate results from a promotional test. This
conclusion occurred in response to a new standard for which the defendants had
not prepared. All of the evidence presented by the defendant, at a minimum,
seems to point to questions of fact for jury determination.60
The Court’s emphasis on overt discrimination in disparate treatment cases
and its failure to take seriously the disparate impact of the test and the possibil-
ity of less discriminatory alternatives make it significantly easier for whites
than racial minorities to bring race discrimination cases.61 This is because
racial minorities have historically been harmed by structural discrimination that
is better addressed by disparate impact cases.
Because many of the structures challenged were designed with white men
in mind, they tend to favor whites, even if the benefit may not be intentional. A
limitation on disparate impact cases will, therefore, harm persons of color.
Where a race-conscious remedy is considered intentional discrimination as it
was in Ricci, white men are benefitted, and persons of color lose. This result
fosters a narrow definition of discrimination that embodies overt conscious
acts, a definition that ignores the most recent social science research demon-
strating the prevalence of subconsciously held negative attitudes by whites
towards members of racial minorities. Besides minorities, women of all races
will also lose from a redefinition of discrimination that disregards historical
discrimination and that ignores implicit bias in favor of men.
But there may be some hope for employers who are trying to assure diver-
sity in all ranks of their workplaces. Employers need carefully to consider all
60 Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, gives a different reading of the facts
in the record. He cites to evidence that the City’s motivation was not to avoid disparate
impact litigation but merely to discriminate on the basis of race. See Ricci v. DeStafano, 129
S.Ct. 2658, 2683–89 (Alito, J., concurring). This evidence, however, appears to point to the
necessity of a trial because there appear to be genuine issues of material fact concerning the
motivation of the City.
61 See Harris &West-Faulcon, supra note 2, at 83.
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the evidence before they put into place promotional tests and other employment
criteria. If they are surprised by a disparate impact resulting from a test or other
neutral policy, they need to gather significant evidence of the impact and of
possible alternatives to the test or policy so they can make out the strong basis
in evidence defense. Employers should also become aware of the structures and
systems that encourage subjective decision making that may result in uncon-
scious bias or prejudice and attempt to overcome these systems and practices.
Ricci definitely makes this effort more difficult, but perhaps not impossible.
